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Gerrymandering and Conceit: The Supreme 
Court’s Conflict with Itself  
MCKAY CUNNINGHAM* 
The Supreme Court has long held that extreme partisan 
gerrymandering violates equal protection, but has simultaneously 
dismissed gerrymandering disputes as nonjusticiable political 
questions. In particular, the Court has maintained that no manageable 
standard yet exists by which the Court could implement the promise of 
equal protection to partisan redistricting. 
 
This Article analyzes the manageable standard requirement, revealing 
the Court’s failure to consistently apply it. Why is “fairness” a 
manageable standard in one context but not another? How are 
standards that measure one’s shocked conscious, or weigh the totality 
of the circumstances manageable? Importantly, when the Court has 
dismissed cases for lack of a manageable standard, it seemingly did so 
to preserve confidence in the judiciary. 
 
Recast in this light, the manageable standard requirement serves as 
proxy for preserving judicial legitimacy. This Article argues that the 
Court should no longer hide behind the manageability barrier because 
partisan gerrymandering is an artificial obstacle to democratic 
governance. Court intervention to ensure democracy’s proper 
functioning was (1) anticipated by the Framers, (2) memorialized in the 
Constitution’s form and structure, and (3) exercised by the Court 
without loss of judicial legitimacy in analogous contexts. This Article 
posits that judicial intervention to unblock the avenues of political 
change is one of the Court’s central responsibilities, that in similar 
contexts the Court has recognized as much, and that it should do so 
again.   
 
 * Associate Professor, Concordia University School of Law. Gerrymandering is an intricate 
problem, and I am grateful to Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos for his insight. I am also thankful 
for the significant editorial contributions provided by Professors Latonia Haney Keith and Ryan Stoa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, for the first time in over forty years, Wisconsin voters 
elected a Republican majority in both state houses, as well as a 
Republican governor.1 Seeking to redraw voting districts in the wake of 
the 2010 census, Republican leadership hired a law firm and a political 
science professor who created a regression model that isolated “the 
baseline partisanship of a unit of geography.”2 In conjunction with 
redistricting software, the regression model allowed lawmakers to 
explore potential districting decisions based on partisan result.3 
[Y]ou would open up a plan that you’d been working on or label a new plan 
and assign it the Assembly district that you wanted to work with and then 
you could also pick a color that you wanted that Assembly district to be. It’s 
sort of like a color-by-number exercise . . . .4 
In addition to data showing the number of people in a district, 
minority group populations, and voting-age populations, the software 
also allowed Republican legislators to customize redistricting maps with 
 
 1. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 846 (W.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d, Gill v. Whitford, 584 U.S. 
__ (2018).  
 2. Id. at 846–47. 
 3. Id. at 847–52. 
 4. Id. at 847–48.  
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ease.5 Republican staff and legal counsel created customized 
demographic data that generated a composite partisan score reflecting 
the political makeup of discrete population units.6 This composite 
partisan score enabled aggregation of those units into new districts that 
revealed the partisan makeup of the new districts.7 
Republican staff members then drafted several statewide maps.8 
The drafters considered traditional districting criteria like compactness 
and communities of interest.9 The drafters also used the composite 
partisan score to assess the level of partisan advantage in each potential 
map.10 The drafters met with individual Republican incumbents to verify 
addresses and solicit redistricting preferences, asking, “are there areas 
you like, are there areas you don’t like, are there areas surrounding your 
district that you like[?]”11  
Over the course of several months, a variety of statewide alternative 
maps emerged, identified by the degree of pro-Republican advantage, 
ranging from “[b]asic” to “[a]ssertive” to “[a]ggressive.”12 The drafters 
then presented a selection of regional maps to Republican leadership, 
along with the partisan scores for each.13 Combining the regional maps 
chosen by Republican leadership, the drafters created the “Final Map.”14 
In a separate document, labeled “Tale of the Tape,” the drafters 
compared the partisan outcome of the proposed final map with the 
State’s current map.15 Under the State’s current map, 49 of 99 seats were 
50 percent or better for Republicans.16 Under the proposed final map, 59 
were 50 percent or better for Republicans.17 
Even so, the drafters again scrutinized the proposed final map for 
partisan performance, identifying and grouping districts into categories 
like “GOP seats strengthened a lot” and “GOP Donors to the Team,” the 
latter of which consisted of incumbents with numbers above 55 percent 
that donated “points” to weaker Republican districts.18 Once finalized, 
 
 5. Id. at 848.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 849–50. 
 9. Id. at 844, 863 (articulating the defendants’ argument as “Act 43’s districts were congruent, 
compact, and fairly equal in population”).  
 10. Id. at  848–49.  
 11. Id. at 849 n.36. One senator suggested how to redraw her district to unseat a Democrat: “If 
you need a way to take the Staskunas seat, put a little bit of my Senate seat into New Berlin.” Id. 
 12. Id. at 849–50.  
 13. Id. at 851. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 852. 
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each Republican legislator received data on his or her new district, along 
with a memorandum detailing census numbers and a comparison of 
election contests in the new district compared to the old.19 The 
memorandum excluded data about compactness, continuity, and non-
partisan communities of interest.20  
When the drafters presented the finalized map at the Republican 
caucus, the drafters stated that “[t]he maps we pass will determine who’s 
here 10 years from now . . . .”21 Both houses voted for the redistricting 
maps, the Governor signed it, and the redistricting maps were published 
as Wisconsin Act 43 on August 23, 2011.22 In 2012, the Republican Party 
garnered 48.6 percent of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates but 
captured 60.6 percent of the Assembly seats.23 In 2014, the Republican 
Party garnered 52 percent of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates 
and won 63.6 percent of the Assembly seats.24 In 2016, the Republican 
Party garnered 52 percent of the statewide vote for Assembly candidates 
and won 64.6 percent of the Assembly seats.25 
A three-judge federal court scrutinized these results and struck 
Wisconsin Act 43 as an unconstitutional gerrymander under both the 
First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause in November 2016.26 
After weeks of litigation, the court in Whitford v. Gill made a series of 
factual findings: 
[T]he drafters sought to understand the partisan effects of the maps they 
were drawing. They designed a measure of partisanship and confirmed the 
accuracy of this measure with Professor Gaddie. They used this measure to 
evaluate regional and statewide maps that they drew. They labeled their 
maps by reference to their partisanship scores, they evaluated partisan 
outcomes of the maps, and they compared the partisanship scores and 
partisan outcomes of the various maps. When they completed a statewide 
map, they submitted it to Professor Gaddie to assess the fortitude of the 
partisan design in the wake of various electoral outcomes.27 
Notably, the court also cited evidence that the drafters intended to 
entrench Republican control for at least a decadeuntil the next 
census.28 Even if statewide support for Republicans fell below 48 percent, 
 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at 853. 
 22. 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 708. 
 23. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 853. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Wisconsin_State_Assembly_elections,_2016 (last visited July 29, 2018).  
 26. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 843, 884.  
 27. Id. at 895. 
 28. Id.  
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the court found that Act 43 assured Republicans a “comfortable 
majority.”29  
The court’s decision in Whitford marks the first time a federal court 
has invalidated a redistricting plan as unconstitutional for partisan 
gerrymandering in over 30 years.30 The Supreme Court has long held that 
extreme partisan gerrymandering violates equal protection, but it has 
simultaneously refused to act and instead labeled such claims non-
justiciable political questions that invite judicial entanglement into a 
“political thicket.”31 In particular, the Court has maintained that no 
judicially manageable standard yet exists by which the Court could 
implement the promise of equal protection to partisan redistricting.32  
This Article examines the Court’s use of judicially manageable 
standards as a barrier to judicial action in partisan gerrymandering 
disputes. A review of the Court’s historical use of the manageable 
standard requirement reveals the Court’s unprincipled and discretionary 
implementation of it, and that the Court often reduces the manageability 
inquiry to a generalized cost-benefit analysis with judicial legitimacy on 
one end of the scale. As such, the manageable standard roadblock is 
properly seen as a deeper insecurity involving appropriateness of judicial 
review. It unearths Professor Bickel’s perennial query regarding the 
proper role of the Court:  
The search must be for a function . . . which is peculiarly suited to the 
capabilities of the courts; which will not likely be performed elsewhere if 
the courts do not assume it; which can be so exercised as to be acceptable 
in a society that generally shares Judge Hand’s satisfaction in a “sense of 
common venture”; which will be effective when needed; and whose 
discharge by the courts will not lower the quality of the other departments’ 
performance by denuding them of the dignity and burden of their own 
responsibility.33 
This Article does not attempt to answer that question globally, but 
argues that in the context of partisan redistricting, judicial intervention 
meets this standard. Court intervention to keep legislators from ensuring 
re-election comports with the structure of the Constitution, itself 
predominantly dedicated to ensuring a representational democracy 
 
 29. Id.  
 30. See generally Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (agreeing that partisan gerrymandering 
was justiciable, but there was no majority agreement among the six justices regarding the applicable 
standard).  
 31. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 310 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 32. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, 
Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 841–42 (2015) 
(“[G]errymandering remains a viable cause of action even after the decisionalbeit without any real 
test for courts to apply.”).  
 33. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF 
POLITICS 24 (1962).  
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resistant to concentrated power in any one branch. Court intervention in 
partisan redistricting is also value neutral. In other words, a 
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review avoids 
constitutionally enshrining the Court’s personal value judgments and 
thereby avoids the criticism that non-elected, life-tenured judges 
override the value judgments made by elected representatives. 
Intervention to unblock the avenues of political change is one of the 
Court’s central responsibilities. In similar contexts, the Court has 
recognized as much and it should do so again in partisan gerrymandering 
disputes. 
Part I surveys the trend toward increased and entrenched partisan 
gerrymandering, as well as the resultant injuries visited on 
representational democracy. Part II reviews legislative unwillingness to 
self-correct and judicial abdication in partisan redistricting disputes 
through the political question doctrine. Part III analyzes the Court’s use 
of judicially manageable standards, attempting to discern how the Court 
determines when a standard is manageable. Part IV argues that the 
manageable standard requirement is largely a question of judicial 
insecurity. Seen this way, the Court’s refusal to engage in gerrymandering 
disputes cuts against recognized constitutional theory and the Court’s 
own practice of intervening when the avenues of democratic 
representation have been obstructed by those in power. The Article 
concludes that the political question doctrine and the manageable 
standard requirement should not bar the Court from deciding the 
constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering claims.  
I.  NON-REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
“In the 2016 elections for the House of Representatives, the average 
electoral margin of victory was 37.1 percent.”34 The winning candidate, 
whether Democrat or Republican, typically won by around 70 percent of 
the vote to the challenging party’s 30 percent of the vote.35 Of 435 
contests, a margin of 5 percent or less arose in only 17.36 Of 435 contests, 
33 were decided by a margin of 10 percent or less.37 “In other words, more 
than 9 out of 10 House races were landslides where the campaign was a 
 
 34. Brian Klass, Gerrymandering Is the Biggest Obstacle to Genuine Democracy in the United 
States. So Why Is No One Protesting?, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/02/10/gerrymandering-is-the-
biggest-obstacle-to-genuine-democracy-in-the-united-states-so-why-is-no-one-protesting/?. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.; see also Nate Silver, So Few Swing Districts, So Little Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 
2012, at A16 (estimating that of the 435 districts in the House of Representatives, there are only 35 
“swing districts”districts “in which the margin in the presidential race was within 5 percentage 
points of the national result”). 
 37. Klass, supra note 34. 
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foregone conclusion before ballots were even cast.”38 One commentator 
noted that such landslide elections, ensuring that those in power remain 
so, might be expected of autocratic nations that are democracies in name 
only.39  
In the 2016 vote for House of Representatives, Republicans won 49.1 
percent of the popular vote and the Democrats won 48 percent.40 
Republicans captured 241 seats, or 55.4 percent, to the Democrats 194 
seats, or 44.6 percent.41 Four years earlier, in 2012, Democrats garnered 
1.4 million more votes than Republicans, but won only 201 seats, 
compared with Republicans capturing 234 seats.42 In 2014, Democrats 
won 47 percent of the two-party vote but only 43 percent of the seats,43 
with the Pew Research Center observing that “there are only 14 truly 
competitive House elections this year.”44 National polls show 10 to 15 
percent approval of Congress, but only 8 of 393 incumbent House 
representatives seeking reelection were defeated by a member of the 
opposing party in 2016.45 
At the state level, similar results emerged. In Pennsylvania in 2012, 
Democrats won 51 percent of the popular state House vote, but only 
captured 5 of 18 House seats, or 27.7 percent.46 In the 2014 House 
elections in Maryland, 57 percent of the votes in House races went to 
Democrats, yet Democrats won 87.5 percent of the House seats.47 
Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, Wyoming and several other states have recently posted 
similar disparities, prompting one scholar to characterize these districts 
as “presumptively unconstitutional.”48 To be sure, gerrymandering is not 
 
 38. Klass, supra note 34. 
 39. Klass, supra note 34 (noting that the 37.1 percent margin of victory is “a figure you’d expect 
from North Korea, Russia or Zimbabwenot the United States.”). 
 40. United States House of Representatives Election, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2016 (last visited July 
29, 2018). 
 41. Id.  
 42. Sam Wang, Opinion, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at SR1. 
 43. Rebecca Ballhaus, Deep Loss by Democrats Obscures Party’s Numbers Problem, WALL ST. J.: 
WASH. WIRE (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:28 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/11/24/loss-by-
democrats-obscures-partys-numbers-problem/. 
 44. Drew DeSilver, For Most Voters, Congressional Elections Offer Little Drama, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/03/for-most-voters-congressional-
elections-offer-little-drama/. 
 45. United States House of Representatives Election, supra note 40. 
 46. United States House of Representatives Elections in Pennsylvania, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Pennsylvania,_20
12 (last visited July 29, 2018). 
 47. See United States House of Representatives Elections in Maryland, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Maryland,_2014 
(last visited July 29, 2018). 
 48. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 837.  
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the sole cause of landslide elections that lack the possibility of 
competitiveness, but it is a significant influence.  
Professor Stephanopoulos conducted a more direct study examining 
the effects of partisan districting on election outcomes.49 The study 
included all states with at least eight congressional districts and all state 
house plans for all elections from 1972 to 2012.50 Interestingly, the study 
revealed a relatively low rate of significant gerrymandering up until the 
2012 election, when partisan gerrymandering spiked significantly.51 The 
study’s authors conclude that “today’s most egregious plans dwarf those 
of their predecessors,” and assert that “the problem of gerrymandering 
has never been worse in modern American history.”52  
Perhaps most telling, several polls show that Americans do not want 
legislators drawing electoral maps. In Virginia, for example, one study 
polled over 1,000 Virginians, with 74 percent supporting districting lines 
drawn by an independent board rather than state legislators.53 Even 
constituents who benefited from gerrymandering rejected it. Of those 
identifying as Republicans, only 19 percent said they wanted lawmakers 
to define election districts.54 The disapproval of partisan gerrymandering 
carried across age and racial groups.55 If the electorate disfavors 
gerrymandering, why haven’t elected officials responded by outlawing it? 
The question illustrates gerrymandering’s central dilemma: The elected 
officials responsible for resisting it are those who most directly benefit 
from it.  
Partisan gerrymandering benefits the legislators and parties 
drawing the district lines, but it carries a host of negative consequences 
for the electorate. Academic research into Congressional behavior yields 
at least one fixed finding: more than anything else, winning elections 
motivates politicians.56 But if opposition is effectively neutralized, the 
negative consequences include less responsiveness, less accountability, 
less ideological diversity, less compromise, and less institutional 
 
 49. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 835–37.  
 50. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 835–37.  
 51. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 867 (asserting that up until 2012 “neither party 
enjoyed a systematic advantage over its opponent.”).  
 52. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 838. 
 53. Citizens Don’t Like Gerrymandering; Study Offers Alternative Redistricting Methods, UVA 
TODAY (June 30, 2014), https://news.virginia.edu/content/citizens-don-t-gerrymandering-study-
offers-alternative-redistricting-methods. 
 54. Benjamin M. Harris & Stephen J. Farnsworth, With Overwhelming Support for Nonpartisan 
Redistricting, Virginians Are Studying Ways to Make That Happen, VA. NEWSL. (June, 27, 2014), 
https://ceps.coopercenter.org/sites/ceps/files/Virginia_News_Letter_2014_Vol._90_No_4_0.pdf. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Silver, supra note 36; Edward Rubin, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1997).  
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legitimacy.57 A legislator elected with a forty percent margin likely 
harbors little incentive to compromise and is constrained, if at all, to 
represent only party constituents.58 Indeed, a strong disincentive to 
compromise stems from the sole electoral vulnerabilitythe primary.59 
If the general election is assured through partisan gerrymandering, the 
primary becomes a contest of radicals.60 The most extreme candidate 
often secures the party nomination, prompting incumbents to eschew 
any semblance of compromise or moderation while in office.61 This, in 
turn, incites gridlock and obstruction exemplified, inter alia, in the 
shutdown of government,62 pandering filibusters,63 and the downgrading 
of the United States’ debt rating.64  
Gerrymandering also evokes voter apathy and disillusionment with 
the institutions of government. Voters respond and participate in close 
elections much more than in elections that appear predetermined.65 
Competitive races carry the secondary benefit of participation in other 
election matters on the same ballot, reflected most clearly in presidential 
election cycles.66 Conversely, predetermined elections curry heightened 
incredulity in policymakers and governing institutions.67 The public’s 
faith in, and goodwill towards, governing institutions decreases with the 
 
 57. See DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 39–42 (2002); JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND: COURTS, 
LEGISLATURES, & REDISTRICTING 194–95 (2003). 
 58. See BUCHMAN, supra note 57, at 194 (noting the self-trenching tendencies gerrymandering 
has and that it “weakens incentives for legislators to satisfy constituents . . . .”).  
 59. Klass, supra note 34 (“In fact, there is a strong disincentive to collaboration, because working 
across the aisle almost certainly means the risk of a primary challenge from the far right or far left of 
the party.”). 
 60. THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 41, 49; see also Tina Rosenberg, Opinion, Increasing Voter 
Turnout for 2018 and Beyond, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/increasing-voter-turnout-2018.html (“In primaries 
and local elections, turnout can dip into single digits. This has proved catastrophic for both major 
parties in our political system, often favoring extreme candidates and ensuring that most incumbents 
have no real contest.”). 
 61. Klass, supra note 34. 
 62. Jack M. Beerman, The New Constitution of the United States: Do We Need One and How 
Would We Get One?, 94 B.U. L. REV. 711, 712–13 (2014). 
 63. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and 
Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 643 (2014) (“At present the 
filibuster more often serves as a means to prevent any legislation from passing.”).  
 64. See Nathan S. Catanese, Note, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous Impact 
of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 324 (2014) (noting that the 
shift to less policy-making and more gridlock in Washington has been “costly to the United States”). 
 65. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 304–13 
(2014); David S. Broder, Voting’s Neglected Scandal, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at A19. 
 66. Editorial, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2014, at A26. 
 67. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 456 (2006) (stating that the harm in political 
gerrymandering is “an abuse of power that, at its core, evinces a fundamental distrust of voters, serving 
the self-interest of the political parties at the expense of the public good”) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 38–50.  
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public’s diluted influence over them.68 As such, gerrymandering has been 
called “the most insidious practice in American politicsa way . . . for 
our elected leaders to entrench themselves in 435 impregnable garrisons 
from which they can maintain political power while avoiding democratic 
realities.”69  
II.  LEGISLATIVE UNWILLINGNESS, JUDICIAL ABDICATION 
Partisan gerrymandering’s persistent drag on representational 
democracy is longstanding, and remediation remains elusive, despite 
clear detriments to core democratic functioning. Legislators, of course, 
have little incentive to temper self-interest in redistricting. No legal 
sanction counterbalances the temptation of ensured reelection and a 
manufactured party majority.70 A long history memorializes legislators’ 
inability to resist temptation.  
Even before nationhood, colonists in rural Pennsylvania attempted 
to deny the city of Philadelphia additional representatives by refusing 
mergers and expansions of jurisdictional boundaries.71 In 1732, the 
Governor of the Province of North Carolina tried to: 
[D]ivide old Precincts established by Law, & to enact new Ones in Places, 
whereby his Arts he has endeavoured to prepossess People in a future 
election according to his desire, his Designs herein being . . . to endeavour 
by his means to get a Majority of his creatures in the Lower House . . . .72  
The First Congress of our new nation suffered allegations of 
gerrymandering at the hands of Patrick Henry, who reputedly attempted 
to manipulate voting districts to the detriment of James Madison.73  
 
 68. See THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 38–50 (explaining the effect of partisan gerrymandering on 
the vitality of the political process, namely that it causes “[e]lectoral institutions [to] become 
congested” and lose legitimacy). 
 69. Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/309084/.  
 70. While state legislators are loath to limit their power of redistricting, federal statutes arguably 
restrict partisan gerrymandering in some instances. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except 
as to the Place of Chusing [sic] Senators.”); Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491 
(providing that Representatives must be elected from single-member districts composed of contiguous 
territory); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276 (2004) (“The power bestowed on Congress to 
regulate elections, and in particular to restrain the practice of political gerrymandering, has not lain 
dormant.”). 
 71. See ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 26–28 (Leon Stein 
ed., 1974). 
 72. THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 380 (William L. Saunders ed., 1886); see also 
GRIFFITH, supra note 71, at 28 (noting that as early as 1732, the governor of North Carolina tried to 
gerrymander his state). 
 73. See 2 WILLIAM C. RIVES, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 655 n.1 (Boston, 
Little, Brown & Co., 1870); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Short, Feb. 9, 1789, reprinted in 
5 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 451 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904). 
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It was not until 1812, however, that the eponymous Elbridge Gerry, 
the Massachusetts Governor, designed a district so grotesque and 
salamander-like as to coin the current locution “gerrymandering.”74 As 
noted above, state legislators today continue to draw voting districts 
predominantly for partisan gain.75 The current practice demonstrates an 
increase, rather than a stagnation or decrease in, the total number of 
gerrymandered districts, as well as the degree of gerrymandered 
entrenchment.76 
With legislators unwilling to forbear, the possibility of reform has 
fallen to the judiciary. Court precedent as it now stands invites 
uncertainty. For the last thirty-one years, the Court has maintained that 
extreme partisan gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection Clause 
while simultaneously refusing to show when or how it violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.77 Instead, a plurality of the Court insists the judiciary 
lacks the ability to show when partisan gerrymandering violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.78 The Court’s reticence to articulate a legal 
standard interpreting open-ended constitutional guarantees like equal 
protection is not new.  
That reticence prevented Court intervention into political districting 
in Colgrove v. Green in 1946.79 Population shifts generated material 
disproportionalities based on outdated districts, handing rural voters a 
lopsided share of the vote.80 The Court refused to intervene, maintaining 
that it was powerless to do so because the Constitution specifically 
entrusted Congress with ensuring a “Republican Form of Government”81 
and with ensuring fair elections: “[T]he Constitution . . . conferred upon 
Congress exclusive authority to secure fair representation.”82 This 
judicial abstention from redistricting lasted sixteen years. 
In 1962, the Warren Court reversed the effect of Colgrove without 
technically overruling it when it declared redistricting justiciable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Guarantee Clause.83 In 
Baker v. Carr, and in a series of subsequent decisions dealing with 
 
 74. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  
 75. See supra Part I.  
 76. See Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 867–76. 
 77. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119 (“Our past decisions also make clear. . . racial gerrymandering 
presents a justiciable equal protection claim.”). 
 78. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279–81 (2004). 
 79. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946) (“It is hostile to a democratic system to 
involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.”). 
 80. Id. at 551–55. 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  
 82. Colgrove, 328 U.S. at 554.  
 83. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 232–37 (1962). 
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disproportionate voting districts, the Court cemented its authority to 
adjudicate the constitutionality of a wide variety of districting disputes.84 
The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause demanded “no less than 
substantially equal state legislative representation for all citizens . . . .”85 
and extended its newly articulated standard of “one person, one vote” to 
Congressional districts,86 popularly sanctioned malapportionment,87 
and local governments.88  
The Court’s interjection into redistricting was not limited to 
malapportionment, but extended into minority vote dilution under the 
Voting Rights Act,89 and then into constitutional racial 
gerrymandering.90 In light of the Court’s active role in such redistricting 
cases, it was unsurprising when the Court agreed to hear a redistricting 
dispute based on partisan gerrymandering. 
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Court again asserted its authority to 
decide redistricting cases.91 It maintained that partisan gerrymandering 
was justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause and that extreme 
instances of partisan gerrymandering violated equal protection.92 A 
majority, however, failed to agree on the standard by which alleged 
violations should be tested. Justice White’s plurality opinion sketched 
out an amorphous test that required discriminatory intent and a 
discriminatory impact that “consistently degrade[d] a . . . group of voters’ 
influence on the political process as a whole.”93 This loose standard 
garnered quick criticism from commentators and courts alike,94 resulting 
 
 84. Id.  
 85. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
 86. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
 87. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736–37 (1964) (stating that it was 
irrelevant that voters approved malapportionment through an initiative).  
 88. Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 397 U.S. 50, 56–58 (1970) (applying the 
principle to a junior college district); Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968) (applying the 
principle to county commissioners).  
 89. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973) (invalidating districting scheme for 
unconstitutionally diluting minority votes). 
 90. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993) (invalidating districting plan for 
improperly relying on race as predominant motive). 
 91. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 132. 
 94. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 37–65 (3d ed. 2007) (identifying lower courts’ struggle with making sense of Bandemer and 
suggesting Justice White’s standard was ineffectual“Bandemer served almost exclusively as an 
invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress. Only one case actually found an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.”); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (“The 
lower courts have lived with that assurance of a standard (or more precisely, lack of assurance that 
there is no standard), coupled with that inability to specify a standard, for the past 18 years.”). 
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in lower courts’ near-universal refusal to invalidate redistricting maps 
based on partisan gerrymandering.95 
Eighteen years later, the Court again took up partisan 
gerrymandering. In another deeply divided opinion, the plurality began 
by lamenting Bandemer’s precedent: ‘‘Throughout its subsequent 
history, Bandemer has served almost exclusively as an invitation to 
litigation without much prospect of redress.’’96 While the entire Court 
affirmed the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of excessive partisan 
gerrymandering, a plurality maintained that such claims were non-
justiciable. The claims were not justiciable, according to the plurality, 
because there are “no judicially discernible and manageable standards 
for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims.”97 The plurality 
revisited Justice White’s standard from Bandemer and decried the 
standard’s obscurity, which it claimed was demonstrated by confusion 
among lower courts.  
The four dissenting justices in Vieth explained that partisan 
gerrymandering disputes were indeed justiciable, but could not agree on 
what the standard should be. The dissenters proposed three possible 
standards by which courts could determine constitutionality.98 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the plurality, dedicated the bulk of the decision to 
 
 95. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279–80; White v. Alabama, 867 F. Supp. 1571, 1576 (M.D. Ala. 1994); 
Marylanders for Fair Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1038 (D. Md. 1994); Fund 
for Accurate & Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F. Supp. 662, 669 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Ill. 
Legislative Redistricting Comm’n v. LaPaille, 782 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Anne Arundel 
Cty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 781 F. Supp. 394, 401 (D. Md. 1991); see 
also Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of 
Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1365 (1987) (discussing why standards are difficult to apply to 
gerrymandering). 
 96. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279 (quoting S. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 886 (rev. 2d ed. 
2002)).  
 97. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281. 
 98. Id. at 317–68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens advocated for a standard targeting 
those instances “when partisanship is the legislature’s sole motivationwhen any pretense of 
neutrality is forsaken unabashedly and all traditional districting criteria are subverted for partisan 
advantage.” Id. at 318. Likewise, Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that a plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case of partisan gerrymandering consisting of five elements. First, the 
plaintiff must be a member of a “cohesive political group . . . which would normally be a major party.” 
Id. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting). Second, the challenged map must have “paid little or no heed to . . . 
traditional districting principles . . . [such as] contiguity, compactness, respect for political 
subdivisions, and conformity with geographic features.” Id. at 347–48. Third, there must be “specific 
correlations between . . . deviations from traditional districting principles and the distribution of the 
population of [the plaintiff’s] group.” Id. at 349. Fourth, an alternative map, complying with traditional 
districting principles must be feasible without diluting the voting strength of plaintiff’s political group. 
Id. Fifth, claimants must show “the defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the 
district” to dilute the voting strength of the claimants’ political group. Id. at 350. Finally, Justice Breyer 
proposed a continuum: The more entrenched the minority hold on power becomes, “the less evidence 
courts will need that the minority engaged in gerrymandering to achieve the desired result.” Id. at 365 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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dismantling these alternative standards and admonishing his colleagues 
that “judicial action must be governed by standard, by rule,” before 
concluding that “no judicially discernible and manageable standards for 
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged.”99 Since no 
litigant or court ascertained a workable standard in the eighteen years 
separating Bandemer from Vieth, the plurality concluded that no such 
standard existed and that such claims were therefore and henceforth 
nonjusticiable.100  
Straddling the gap between plurality and dissent, Justice Kennedy 
agreed with the plurality that a manageable standard had not emerged 
yet, but disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that a manageable 
standard did not exist, stating: “I would not foreclose all possibility of 
judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct 
an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting 
cases.”101 Divided in this way, Vieth presents a precedential purgatory. As 
a plurality opinion, it fails to overturn Bandemer’s premise of 
justiciability. But until the Court sanctions a judicially discernible and 
manageable standard, Vieth effectively insulates partisan 
gerrymandering from constitutional scrutiny, especially when 
considering the unlikely emergence of a “precise” standard.102  
In one sense, the Vieth plurality has come full circle to Colgrove v. 
Green. The plurality in Vieth and the Court in Colgrove placed 
redistricting cases outside the judiciary’s reach by characterizing such 
disputes as nonjusticiable. But the Vieth plurality diverges from Colgrove 
in one critical aspect: Where the Colgrove Court held redistricting non-
justiciable as a matter of constitutional mandate,103 the Vieth plurality 
maintained that redistricting for partisan purposes was nonjusticiable as 
a matter of judicial prudence.104 Said differently, the Constitution 
provides that Congress has authority to ensure fair elections and a 
republican form of government, but it says nothing about the judiciary’s 
obligation to fashion judicially manageable standards.105  
 
 99. Id. at 278, 281. 
 100. Id. at 306 (“Eighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that 
Bandemer is incapable of principled application. We would therefore overrule that case, and decline 
to adjudicate these political gerrymandering claims.”). 
 101. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 102. See supra note 98.  
 103. Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946). 
 104. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306. 
 105. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 
890–91 (5th ed. 2006) (characterizing the first Baker factor as “jurisdictional,” and distinguishing 
same from “[f]actors two and three of the Baker test, [which] seem to reflect a different idea [than the 
first].”); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine 
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 258–61 (2002) (indexing the prudential 
rationales as distinct from classical political question cases). 
CUNNINGHAM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/19/2018  2:26 PM 
August 2018] GERRYMANDERING AND CONCEIT 1523 
III.  GERRYMANDERING AS NONJUSTICIABLE  
If it is true, as the Court has held for over three decades, that 
excessive partisan gerrymandering violates the Equal Protection 
Clause,106 and if legislators refuse to self-correct, the Court’s reluctance 
to address the problem due to its self-imposed asylum merits close 
scrutiny.107 What is a judicially manageable standard? What test does the 
Court employ to determine whether a proposed standard is manageable? 
When and how has that test been used in other constitutional contexts?  
A. GERRYMANDERING AS A POLITICAL QUESTION  
It is worth remembering that the political question doctrine, of 
which the requirement for a judicially manageable standard is a subset, 
was a twin.108 The birth of judicial review also witnessed the birth of the 
political question doctrine, a doctrine that requires judicial abstention in 
instances inappropriate for judicial review.109 Even as Chief Justice 
Marshall secured enormous judicial power, he simultaneously tempered 
its exercise:  
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, 
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in 
which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be 
made in this court.110  
From this foundation, the Court later constructed criteria from 
which to determine when coordinate branches of government retain sole 
authority to interpret and enforce particular constitutional provisions. 
Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, articulated the most frequently cited 
statement of these criteria: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
 
 106. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293 (reflecting a concession by the plurality that “excessive injection of 
politics [in districting] is unlawful. So it is, and so does our opinion assume.”).  
 107. See Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976) 
(maintaining that the artificial nature of the political question doctrine that excuses the judiciary from 
performing its core judicial function “cries for strict and skeptical scrutiny”). 
 108. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 109. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). Although the Court asserts its inability to 
decide issues that are deemed political questions, some commentators maintain that the political 
question doctrine does not exist as a justiciability doctrine, but rather serves as a proxy in determining 
whether Congress or the executive acted within their powers in political question cases. See Henkin, 
supra note 107, at 599; Gwynne Skinner, Misunderstood, Misconstrued, and Now Clearly Dead: The 
“Political Question Doctrine” as a Justiciability Doctrine, 29 J.L. & POL. 427, 427–28 (2014) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has never applied the ‘political question doctrine’ as a true justiciability  
doctrine . . . .”). 
 110. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170 (ruling that the Court had the authority to review an act of Congress, 
and then declaring the portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Court original jurisdiction over 
writs of mandamus unconstitutional under Article III of the Constitution).  
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a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.111  
The potency of the political question doctrine lies in its finality. Once 
labeled a political question, the judiciary may not consider the underlying 
merits.112 Discrete constitutional issues remain unanswered due to the 
Court’s adherence to the political question doctrine.113 Indeed, in several 
instances the Court seemingly identifies a constitutional violation, but 
nevertheless permits it, claiming an inability to redress the 
transgression.114 The political question doctrine has excused the Court 
from considering whether a state’s chartered government was a 
“republican form of government” under Art. IV, section 4,115 whether 
proposed constitutional amendments expire if unratified for too long,116 
and whether an impeachment trial by Senate committee violates the 
constitution’s provision allocating that power to “the Senate.”117  
Lower courts apply the political question doctrine more frequently 
and in contexts not yet considered by the Supreme Court. The 
constitutionality of executive action committing troops into potential 
combat largely remains unaddressed by the Supreme Court, but lower 
courts have relied on the political question doctrine to avoid disputes 
stemming from the war in Vietnam118 and U.S. military involvement in 
 
 111. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 112. See generally Barkow, supra note 105; Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question 
Doctrine and the Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215 (1985); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001); Jesse Choper, 
The Political Question Doctrine, Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457 (2005); Amy Endicott, The 
Judicial Answer: Treatment of the Political Question Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims, 28 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 537 (2010). 
 113. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (though refusing to address the merits 
of the case, conceding that “excessive injection of politics [in districting] is unlawful. So it is, and so 
does our opinion assume.”). But see Skinner, supra note 109, at 428 (asserting that in nearly all 
political question cases, the Court essentially found that “the branch whose conduct was being 
challenged acted legallyin other words, within its constitutional or statutory powers.”).  
 114. As noted above, the Court in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), refused to correct 
malapportioned voting districts by characterizing reapportionment as a “political thicket” that courts 
must avoid and by finding that Congress had the sole authority to correct election impropriety under 
the Constitution. See supra Part II.  
 115. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849). 
 116. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939). 
 117. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229–31 (1993).  
 118. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309–12 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 
936 (1974); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). 
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Nicaragua119 and El Salvador.120 More recently, district courts have used 
the political question doctrine to avoid merits review of cases involving 
environmental harms.121 In one suit against major automobile 
manufacturers, claimants sought redress for increased forest fires, 
disrupted water supply, and increased flood risk.122 The district court 
dismissed the public nuisance suit citing no “manageable method of 
discerning the entities that are creating and contributing to the alleged 
nuisance.”123 Branding critical issues like foreign environmental harms 
and military action as political questions reduces the likelihood of legal 
finality, while implicitly sanctioning the status quo.124  
B. GERRYMANDERING AS A PRUDENTIAL POLITICAL QUESTION 
Not all of the six criteria articulated in Baker share equal footing. 
Justice Scalia, in Vieth, maintained that “[t]hese tests are probably listed 
in descending order of both importance and certainty.”125 Scholars have 
long divided the six criteria into two categories: classical and 
prudential.126 Classical political questions are those in which the 
Constitution allocates decision-making authority to a coordinate 
branch.127 They are rooted in a commitment to separation of powers and 
 
 119. See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp. 1236, 1238–40 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing 
to review a private citizen’s challenge to the U.S. Government’s use of private land in Honduras for 
military purposes), aff’d on other grounds, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev’d on reh’g, 745 F.2d 1500 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), aff’d on other grounds, 788 
F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing 
to review claims arising out of U.S. government actions in Nicaragua), aff’d, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 
1985). 
 120. See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984). 
 121. See generally Philip Weinberg, “Political Questions”: An Invasive Species Infecting the 
Courts, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 (2009).  
 122. See generally California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007). 
 123. Id. at *15.  
 124. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1050 
(1985) (“If the judiciary declines to resolve sensitive constitutional disputes, the nation is effectively 
left in a constitutional state of nature, in which the constitutional position that prevails is the one that 
is the politically or physically most powerful.”). 
 125. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004). 
 126. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 246 (discussing the classical and prudential versions of the 
political question doctrine); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 TermForeword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 79 (1961) (analyzing prudential considerations); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1211–12 (2006) (assessing Baker v. Carr’s impact 
on prudential criteria); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1959) (discussing what the political question doctrine should assess).  
 127. See Gerhardt, supra note 126, at 1211–13 (“Luther v. Borden is famous for recognizing the 
classical political question doctrine, which treats as nonjusticiable matters committed by the 
Constitution to other authorities’ final decision-making.”).  
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limited judicial review.128 When Judge Nixon claimed that his 
impeachment trial by Senate Committee violated the Constitution, the 
Court declined a merits ruling by relying on Article I: “The Senate shall 
have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”129 The Constitution, 
according to the Court, allocated decision-making regarding 
impeachment processes to Congress alone.130  
Prudential political questions, by contrast, “are [not] to be found in 
[the] Constitution.”131 They derive from a sense of prudence and 
austerity, rather than from rule of law. The requirement of a judicially 
manageable standard is a prudential one.132 Although the requirement 
for a manageable standard could arguably be characterized as a classical 
political question when combined with other criteria,133 the plurality’s 
decision in Vieth that partisan gerrymandering is a political question 
rested solely on the lack of a manageable standard.134 Notably, the Vieth 
plurality did not claim that the Constitution bestowed legislatures with 
final decision making authority over the redistricting process. To do so 
would have uprooted the Court’s malapportionment and racial 
districting precedents. 
As a result, the Court’s paralysis on partisan gerrymandering does 
not stem from the assignment of decision-making authority over 
redistricting to a coordinate branch. Instead, the Court’s paralysis 
reflects a deep-seated insecurity regarding the appropriate exercise of the 
judicial function. The Vieth plurality said as much, stating that an unclear 
court-made standard was not worth “the partisan enmity it brings upon 
the courts.”135 The plurality went on to suggest that the legislative branch 
is better suited to devise such a standard: “Laws promulgated by the 
Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law 
 
 128. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 246–49 (describing the “classical” political question doctrine 
as developed by Chief Justice Marshall). 
 129. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229 (1993) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6).  
 130. See id. (“The language and structure of this Clause are revealing. The first sentence is a grant 
of authority to the Senate, and the word ‘sole’ indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and 
nowhere else.”). 
 131. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453 (1939) (discussing both classical and prudential criteria 
in determining the Court should not decide questions regarding expiration of proposed constitutional 
amendments). 
 132. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 265 (“The Court in Baker therefore recognized not only the 
classical theory of the political question doctrine . . . but the prudential strand as well . . . .”). 
 133. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 333 (noting that commentators occasionally disagree about 
whether a particular holding is “prudential” or “classical,” especially because political question 
holdings often rely on similar underlying justifications); see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–29 (noting 
that “the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a 
textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”).  
 134. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004); see also Joshua S. Stillman, Note, The Costs of 
“Discernible and Manageable Standards” in Vieth and Beyond, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1292, 1299 (2009). 
 135. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301. 
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pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon 
reasoned distinctions.”136 This statement, in a gerrymandering case, 
carries some irony. The legislative branch propagates gerrymandering. 
The problem is one of its own making. In 241 years, legislators have 
shown little willingness to address gerrymandering, and a great appetite 
to expand and entrench its influence,137 making the Court’s exhortation 
that the legislature is better suited to address gerrymandering issues 
inapposite.  
Notably, legal theory justifying the political question doctrine 
parallels the distinction between classical and prudential.138 Classical 
political questions are bound by law; textual commitments of decision-
making authority to a coordinate branch require judicial abstention.139 
As a result, justification for abstention derives from the text and structure 
of the Constitution itself.140 The concentration of power in any one 
branch or official invites authoritarianism and undermines 
representative democracy.141 The Court has historically parroted this 
basic tenet of American democracy in its landmark decisions, and the 
rationale supporting classical political questions surfaces in the most 
prominent political question cases.142  
Justifications for prudential political questions are more 
practical.143 They are necessarily distinct from the text of the Constitution 
and are grounded instead on “theories of normative policy.”144 Judicial 
abdication based on prudence is justified by the following:  
 
 136. Id. at 278. 
 137. See supra Part II.  
 138. See supra note 126. 
 139. See supra note 126. 
 140. Wechsler, supra note 126, at 7–8. 
 141. Although the separation of powers justification for the political doctrine appears unassailable 
at first blush, Professors Redish and Henkin, among others, have forwarded strong arguments for the 
abolition of the political question doctrine altogether, including classical political questions. Henkin, 
supra note 107, at 600; Redish, supra note 124, at 1031–33. 
 142. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
228–31 (1993); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1973); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 
(1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553–54 (1946); 
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42–43 (1849); see also Scott Birkey, Casenote, Gordon v. Texas and the 
Prudential Approach to Political Questions, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1265, 1271 (2000) (“The constitutional 
rationale behind the political question doctrine emphasizes the separation of powers principle.”).  
 143. See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions, 
Prudence, and the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899, 1908–15 (2006) (“The prudential 
strand offers a flexible and shifting boundary, to be drawn by the courts in accordance to prevailing 
trends in public opinion.”); Skinner, supra note 109, at 427–28. Notably, some doubt remains 
regarding the prudential distinction. Justice Sotomayor, for example, listed the last three Baker 
criteria as prudential, whereas Professor Scharpf identified a separate category, “functional” political 
questions, which includes what others deem prudential. Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the 
Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. J. 517, 566 (1966). 
 144. Redish, supra note 124, at 1045. 
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(1) the inability of the judiciary to develop general principles and rules of 
construction of a particular constitutional provision; (2) the judiciary’s lack 
of institutional capacity to review particular judgments of one or both of 
the political branches; and (3) the judicial humility that flows from the 
judiciary’s inherently undemocratic nature . . . . [(4)] the fear that the 
judiciary’s authority and legitimacy will be undermined by a blatant 
disregard of its decision by the political branches.145 
Each justification listed above has received significant scholarly 
attention.146 It is not the aim of this Article to recount what others already 
have done so well. Instead, a precise study of the political question 
doctrine as applied to partisan gerrymandering reveals that the Court’s 
reticence to decide such disputes is unsupported by the underlying 
rationales that animate prudential political questions.  
C. GERRYMANDERING AS LACKING A JUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE STANDARD 
It is worth repeating that the Vieth Court refused review based on 
one of six Baker criteria.147 The Court did not hold that the Guarantee 
Clause or Article I, section four provided grounds to withhold review. As 
such, the underlying justification supporting classical political questions 
is inapplicable.148 Instead, the Court solely relied on a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards. Standing alone, the manageable 
standard requirement is prudential.149 It is not imposed by law, but by 
the Court itself.150 It is more guideline than mandate, and consequently 
the Court can choose to disregard it without legal infraction.151 But before 
analyzing when the Court chooses to adhere to the manageable standard 
requirement, the requirement must first be defined. What is a judicially 
manageable standard?  
 
 145. Redish, supra note 124, at 1043–44 (synthesizing Professor Bickel’s characterization of the 
most prominent rationales for the political question doctrine).  
 146. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 105, at 244; Henkin, supra note 107, at 600; Redish, supra note 
124, at 1034–35. 
 147. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004); see also Stillman, supra note 134, at 1299 (“What 
makes Vieth’s use of the [prudential political question doctrine] unique, at least in the post-Baker 
[political question doctrine] era, is that it relied on the lack of judicially discernible and manageable 
standards as an independently sufficient rationale for rendering a [political question doctrine] 
holding, without any genuine argument that the issue was textually committed to a coordinate federal 
branch.”). 
 148. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving the 
Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (2002) (identifying the “only 
Baker factor that did not necessarily implicate separation of powers‘a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards’ . . . .”) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 189, 217 (1962)). 
 149. See Redish, supra note 124, at 1043 (“In my discussion, then, it is necessary to make clear that 
by ‘prudential’ I refer to all rationales for effective judicial abdication of review power, other than a 
basis in the text of the Constitution.”). 
 150. Redish, supra note 124, at 1043. 
 151. Redish, supra note 124, at 1043. 
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1. Defining Manageability  
Within the context of gerrymandering, the Vieth Court rejected 
Justice White’s proposed standard as well as the three standards 
proposed by the dissenters, illustrating examples of proposals that failed 
to constitute manageable standards.152 But the Court did not define the 
term, nor did it address larger, structural questions. How are manageable 
standards defined? What is the test used by the Court to determine 
whether a proposed standard is manageable? How has the Court used 
that standard in other constitutional contexts, and what rationale 
supports it? Professor Fallon addressed many of these questions by 
aggregating and analyzing each time the Court meaningfully employed 
the manageable standard requirement.153 His review revealed that “the 
Supreme Court has never attempted to define what it means by judicially 
manageable standards nor to specify what role courts should perform in 
developing them.”154  
Even so, the Court’s repeated use of the manageable standard 
requirement has yielded insights. First, the Court has recognized a 
distinction between the Constitution’s provisions and the tests fabricated 
by the Court that attempt to enforce them.155 This distinction is most 
clearly seen when the Court creates standards from open-ended 
constitutional provisions like equal protection and due process.156 Within 
the context of gerrymandering, for example, the Court unanimously 
agreed that egregious cases violate equal protection.157 But that 
constitutional assurance, standing alone, does not necessitate 
justiciability: “The issue we have discussed is not whether severe partisan 
gerrymanders violate the Constitution, but whether it is for the courts to 
say when a violation has occurred, and to design a remedy.”158 
Second, the Court’s practice of devising standards that enforce 
constitutional norms presents no obstacle.159 The Equal Protection 
 
 152. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (stating that Bandemer’s majority was unable 
to “enunciate the judicially discernible and manageable standard that it thought existed” and 
“[e]ighteen years of essentially pointless litigation have persuaded us that Bandemer is incapable of 
principled application”); see also supra note 98 (assessing the various Justices approaches to 
establishing workable standards). 
 153. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1285–1296 (2006).  
 154. Id. at 1281. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. at 1281–82 (“[T]he need for judicially manageable standards that are distinct from an 
underlying constitutional norm arises when the norm itself fails the requirement of judicial 
manageability.”). 
 157. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293.  
 158. Id. at 292. 
 159. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1281–84 (“[T]he bare language of the Equal Protection Clause 
is not a judicially manageable standard in political gerrymandering disputes. In another usage, 
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Clause, itself, is not a judicially manageable standard.160 A judicially-
designed standard is needed to implement equal protection’s promise. 
Almost every Justice in Vieth strove to articulate a workable standard or 
demonstrate why a proposed standard was unworkable.161 None attacked 
the underlying premise, that the judicial function includes authority to 
design workable standards in the first place.162  
Third, the standard fabricated by the Court need not precisely reflect 
constitutional meaning.163 The Vieth Court pursued a “workable” 
formulation, one that hewed to the spirit of equal protection’s promise 
without having to replicate it exactly.164 This, of course, implies that the 
Court tolerates, even expects, a gap between constitutional guarantees 
and the court-made standards devised to implement them. As Professor 
Fallon suggests, “[a]lthough close enough is good enough, too much 
disparity will not do.”165  
While valuable in many ways, these insights fail to unveil how the 
Court determines whether a given standard is manageable, or “close 
enough.” The Equal Protection Clause says nothing, for example, about a 
compelling government interest required before government action 
targets certain groups.166 It says nothing about redistricting based on race 
as a predominate factor,167 or the necessity for clear guidance in 
determining voter intent when counting ballots.168 Yet, in each instance, 
the Court used the relatively elastic Equal Protection Clause to fashion 
manageable standards that deviate in various degrees from the meaning 
of the Clause itself.169 Of course, this practice is not limited to the Equal 
Protection Clause. A wide array of decisions contain meaningful gaps 
 
however, judicially manageable standards are not so much inputs as the outputs of constitutional 
adjudication. A judicially manageable standard is an output, rather than an input, in any case in which 
a court successfully devises a test that can thereafter be used to implement a constitutional provision 
that is not itself a judicially manageable standard.”). 
 160. Fallon, supra note 153, at 1283.  
 161. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–368. 
 162. See generally id.  
 163. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1281–84 (“[T]he Justices participating in Vieth all appeared to 
assume that a judicially manageable standardif one could be devisedneed not replicate the 
Constitution’s meaning precisely.”). 
 164. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292–368.  
 165. Fallon, supra note 153, at 1284. 
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1996); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Redish, supra note 124, at 1046 (noting that 
“the Court has adopted shifting standards of scrutiny under the equal protection clause that find little 
or no basis in the vague terms of that provision.”). 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910 (1995). 
 168. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000). 
 169. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104–05; Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Miller, 515 U.S. at 903–04; 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
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between constitutional text and court-made standards. Whether 
personal jurisdiction,170 establishment of religion,171 or obscenity,172 the 
Court has historically confronted textual ambiguity with judicially 
designed standards that either over-enforce or under-enforce 
constitutional meaning.173 These many instances demonstrate that no 
uniform standard guides the Court when it delineates manageable from 
unmanageable.174 According to some scholars, the standard used by the 
Court to determine manageability is itself unmanageable: “[T]he Court 
makes its judgements about whether proposed standards count as 
judicially manageable under criteria that would themselves fail to qualify 
as judicially manageable. . . .”175  
While it is tempting to conclude that the Court’s illusory process for 
determining manageability frustrates efforts to understand that 
requirement,176 a partial remedy would be a baseline requirement that 
the standard be intelligible and practical. In other words, to be 
manageable, the standard must be, at minimum, understandable. As 
Justice Scalia puts it, unintelligibility is akin to “judging whether a 
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”177 It then helps 
if the standard is practical in the sense that it will likely lead to fairly 
 
 170. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112–14 (1987); Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–73 (1985); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811–
12 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 171. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678–79 (1984); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (Straying further away from the text of the establishment clause, Justice O’Connor 
fabricated a new and improved “reasonable person” for purposes of the endorsement test, explaining 
that “[t]he relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, 
and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement’ of religion.”). 
 172. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (adopting a three-pronged test for speech falling 
outside the parameters of the First Amendment’s protection of “free speech”). 
 173. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1298–1306 (“[A] number of doctrinal tests underenforce 
constitutional norms (just as other tests produce overenforcement), often for reasons of judicial 
manageability . . . .”). 
 174. Baker v. Carr provides an example relevant to redistricting. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Baker 
Court found a manageable standard existed for malapportionment disputes under the Fourteenth 
Amendment even though no manageable standard reputedly existed for malapportionment disputes 
under the Guarantee Clause. Id. at 209–10. The rationale for discovering a test under one provision 
but not the other has little bearing on the court-made standard itself. See Redish, supra note 124, at 
1046 (identifying a range of court-made standards before suggesting that “one must suspect the 
disingenuousness of the ‘absence-of-standards’ rationale.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 153, at 1278. 
 176. Redish, supra note 124, at 1047 (“Ultimately, any constitutional provision can be supplied 
with working standards of interpretation.”). 
 177. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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consistent results178 as well as results that are actionable.179 Judicial 
competence, the ability of the court to fully comprehend the facts of 
certain cases as well as the predictability of results stemming from 
judicial intervention, are implicit within this consideration.180 Lower 
courts, for example, often avoid the merits of cases involving foreign 
affairs, citing lack of expertise.181 Similarly, a standard that generates 
predictable and consistent results is more likely to be manageable. As 
Justice Scalia opined in Vieth, “Some criterion more solid and more 
demonstrably met than [fairness] that seems to us necessary to enable 
the state legislatures to discern the limits of their districting discretion, 
[and] to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts . . . .”182  
While these baseline factors are helpful, they have not been 
consistently followed, and are not themselves determinative.183 The Vieth 
Court, for example, rebuked Justice Powell’s purported “fairness” 
standard for gerrymandering disputes, even though fairness and justness 
play prominent parts in other constitutional standards.184 Indeed, 
 
 178. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 
(1989) (stating that “reckonability” is a “needful characteristic”). 
 179. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1291–92 (discussing courts’ lack of competence to make general 
factual or predictive judgments).  
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 274–75 (1946) (“It seems certain, however, 
that courts do not possess the techniques or the personnel to consider and act upon the complex 
combinations of factors entering into the problems.”) (Black, J., dissenting).  
 181. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1310 (2d Cir. 1973) (avoiding the merits of 
dispute involving military action in Cambodia by claiming a nonjusticiable political question because 
the dispute raised “precisely the questions of fact involving military and diplomatic expertise not 
vested in the judiciary . . . .”); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Judges, deficient 
in military knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield 
decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the field of action, cannot reasonably or appropriately 
determine whether a specific military operation constitutes an ‘escalation’ of the war or is merely a 
new tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan.”); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 
517–18 (D. Mass. 1968) (avoiding merits review of claims regarding the legality of military tactics in 
Vietnam because a “domestic tribunal is incapable of eliciting the facts during a war, and because it is 
probably incapable of exercising a disinterested judgment which would command the confidence of 
sound judicial opinion”). 
 182. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004). These practical considerations are balanced 
against the fact that a standard, by definition, entails more flexibility than a rule, which is a rigid and 
determinate formulation. The more flexible the standard, the more judgement and discretion 
required, carrying the concomitant risk of inconsistent results. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1286 
(assessing the inconsistency that stems from flexible standards). 
 183. See Fallon, supra note 153, at 1293 (claiming unanswerable questions regarding “how much 
analytical bite, or how much predictability or consistency of judicial decisionmaking” is required).  
 184. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86, 95–97 (2004) (explaining that “considerations of 
fairness” must be considered for equitable remedies); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 
(2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that “fairness and justice” indicate when a government 
taking of property has occurred); Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993) (noting that the 
federal rules of civil procedure call for separate trials of codefendants when “justice requires”); Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (asserting that personal jurisdiction turns on 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
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constitutional jurisprudence teems with standards that lack 
administrative facility and ready redress, including balancing tests,185 
state-of-mind probes,186 and totality of the circumstances inquiries.187 In 
the due process context, constitutionality has turned on whether one’s 
conscience has been shocked.188 These examples illustrate that any 
constitutional provision, regardless of opacity, can be outfitted with a 
court-made standard. As Professor Redish notes, “those standards often 
will not clearly flow from either the language or history of the provision, 
but that fact does not distinguish them from many judicial standards 
invoked every day.”189  
2. Manageability as Proxy for Judicial Legitimacy 
Given the many instances in which court-made standards deviate 
from constitutional text, and in light of the varying degrees of deviation, 
the Court often employs a generalized cost-benefit analysis.190 Is the cost 
of reduced judicial legitimacy outweighed by the benefit achieved 
through an unwieldy judicial standard? This cost-benefit overlay to 
manageability pervades Vieth. The dissenters did not argue that their 
proposed standards perfectly fit the constitutional guarantee; the 
dissenters argued that their proposed standards were better than the 
 
 185. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761, 785 (1985); 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 1052 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926–
28 (1984); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 350 (1984); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516–17 
(1976); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Matthews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61–68 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943 (1987) (providing a thorough review of balancing tests). 
 186. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) (explaining that “the offending conduct 
must be wanton”); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989) (stating that “[t]he Eighth 
Amendment terms ‘cruel’ and ‘punishments’ clearly suggest some inquiry into subjective state of 
mind”); id. at 397 (explaining that Johnson v. Glick’s substantive due process standard puts the 
defendant’s subjective motivation in issue); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding that 
“the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended 
loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property”); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural 
Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 173 (2010) (citing difficulty 
pleading factually plausible claims where constitutionality turns on defendant officials’ subjective state 
of mind). 
 187. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 153, at 1288–89, 1288 n.57 (collecting numerous totality of 
circumstances cases). 
 188. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (identifying the “shocks the conscience” 
standard). Some standards, although amorphous on their own, acquire greater certainty and 
predictability with frequent application. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884–91 (1996). 
 189. Redish, supra note 124, at 1047. 
 190. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 300–01 (2004); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
236 (1993); see also Fallon, supra note 153, at 1278 (“In making this ultimate judgment, the Court, 
willy-nilly, conducts a startlingly open-ended inquiry in which, among other things, it weighs the costs 
and benefits of adjudicating pursuant to particular proposed standards.”).  
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status quo.191 Imperfect enforcement outweighs no enforcement at all. 
Justice Scalia’s plurality, perhaps surprisingly, also reduced the 
manageability analysis to a generalized balancing of the perceived benefit 
attending the adoption of an imperfect standard against the perceived 
detriment of reduced judicial legitimacy: 
Is the regular insertion of the judiciary into districting, with the delay and 
uncertainty that it brings to the political process and the partisan enmity it 
brings upon the courts, worth the benefit to be achievedan accelerated 
(by some unknown degree) effectuation of the majority will? We think 
not.192 
Perhaps Justice Scalia cribbed this balancing testmanageability 
balanced against the Court’s reputationfrom Baker v. Carr in which 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan dissented from court intervention in 
malapportionment disputes.193 “Those who consider that continuing 
national respect for the Court’s authority depends in large measure upon 
its wise exercise of self-restraint and discipline in constitutional 
adjudication will view the decision with deep concern.”194 Or, perhaps 
Justice Scalia’s balancing test hailed from the Court’s refusal to interpret 
impeachment processes, wherein the Court admonished that “opening 
the door of judicial review . . . would ‘expose the political life of the 
country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.’”195 In fact, Justice Scalia 
could have drawn inspiration for the balancing test from a well-spring of 
judicial precedent in which the Court declined review to foster 
institutional legitimacy.196 As shown above, judicial restraint in the 
service of judicial legitimacy is a principal rationale for the political 
question doctrine itself. Viewed through this lens, the manageable 
standard roadblock reflects a deeper, historical insecurity involving 
appropriateness of judicial review. 
IV.  JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY AND REPRESENTATIONAL DEMOCRACY 
Condensing the foregoing analysis is helpful. The Court has 
exercised, without serious question, its authority to devise standards that 
seek to implement constitutional norms. The Court has accepted a 
certain degree of deviation when court-made standards fail to capture 
constitutional norms perfectly. Such deviations cannot be “too great,” 
 
 191. See supra note 98.  
 192. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301. 
 193. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 330–40 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 267–330 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
 194. Id. at 340 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 195. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 
 196. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 
108–15 (1988) (characterizing the political question doctrine in terms of judicial restraint in the 
service of judicial legitimacy). 
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although no consistent test has emerged by which the Court determines 
whether a standard deviates too much, and is therefore unmanageable. 
At bottom, the standard must be intelligible. And, though not 
determinative, the standard’s practical effects like predictability and ease 
of implementation have played a part in manageability decisions. Most 
importantly, the Court often enmeshes manageability with judicial 
review and related concerns of judicial legitimacy.197  
This preoccupation with judicial legitimacy is as old as the Court 
itself.198 Assuming that the Court’s concern is valid, and that protecting 
its reputation justifies abdication in certain instances, this Article argues 
that gerrymandering is not one of them, and that the judiciary validly 
intervenes when it acts to ensure representational democracy’s proper 
functioning. Correcting artificial obstructions that truncate or unduly 
dilute popular sovereignty is value-neutral and well within the judiciary’s 
expertise. By contrast, judicial interjection that constitutionally 
enshrines one substantive value over another necessarily implicates the 
bias of a non-elected Court and has historically proved problematic. 
A. CONSTITUTION AS FORM AND PROCESS 
The form and structure of the Constitution support judicial review 
of disputes that challenge obstructions to representative democracy. 
Neophytes, upon first reading the Constitution, are often surprised that 
the document, particularly before amendment, resembles a sterile 
recitation of compartmental design: which branch and which official has 
authority to do which thing. The few substantive rights in the body of the 
document are enfolded into larger prescriptions that allocate political 
power and ensure constituent participation in government.199 
Prohibitions against bills of attainder, titles of nobility, and corruption of 
blood do little to burnish the constitution’s reputation as the repository 
of individual liberties.200 Said differently, the Constitution primarily 
separates powers and outlines processes for effective governance by the 
people.201 Even the substantive rights clauses, like Ex Post Facto and Bills 
of Attainder, can be viewed as performing separation-of-powers 
functions.202 The Constitutionand by extension, judicial 
 
 197. See supra Part III. 
 198. See Barkow, supra note 105, at 253–56 (providing a brief history of the Court’s use of the 
prudential factors, in part, to protect the judicial legitimacy).  
 199. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517–18 (4th ed. 2013) (“The text of the 
Constitution, apart from the Bill of Rights, contains few provisions concerning individual liberties.”). 
 200. Id.  
 201. See id. at 218 (“[T]he framers thought that an enumeration of rights was unnecessary . . . .”). 
 202. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 90 (1980). 
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reviewprincipally focuses on structure and process in a 
representational government of separated powers.203  
The amendments, while somewhat more concerned with individual 
liberties, are certainly not singularly so. Most of the amendments are 
either procedural in function or identify a substantive right that itself 
facilitates governmental processes.204 The First Amendment, for 
example, guards against government overreach by protecting political 
discourse.205 It serves a structural purpose as much as an individualized 
one.206 The Fourth Amendment combines an individual privacy right 
with procedural protections by suppressing evidence seized from illegal 
searches.207 “Amendments five through eight,” as Professor Ely notes, 
“tend to become relevant only during lawsuits, and we tend therefore to 
think of them as procedural . . . , calculated to enhance the fairness and 
efficiency of the litigation process.”208 The amendments added after 1868 
largely expand democratic participation through voting, whether based 
on race,209 gender,210 wealth,211 location,212 or age.213  
By contrast, attempts to embed substantive rights in the 
Constitution’s text have a questionable record. The institutionalization of 
slavery in the body of the Constitution illustrates a substantive right 
remedied only at a horrific price.214 Temperance, also enshrined as a 
substantive right, produced upheaval before constitutionally erased 
through the Twenty-First amendment.215 Some argue the substantive 
right to possess guns fits the same pattern.216 The Constitution is a poor 
vehicle for cementing popular value judgments, which tend to evolve 
 
 203. Id. at 89. (“The theme that justice and happiness are best assured not by trying to define them 
for all time, but rather by attending to the governmental processes by which their dimensions would 
be specified over time, carried over into our critical constitutional documents.”).  
 204. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–XXVII.  
 205. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L REV. 413, 443 (1996). 
 206. ELY, supra note 202, at 94. 
 207. ELY, supra note 202, at 96. 
 208. ELY, supra note 202, at 95. 
 209. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.  
 210. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  
 211. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.  
 212. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
 213. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 214. See Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A 
Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 413, 418–20 (2006) (arguing that 
although slavery was memorialized in the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence 
foreshadowed slavery’s “ultimate demise.”). 
 215. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Sidney J. Spaeth, The Twenty-First Amendment and State 
Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 161, 176–
80 (1991) (detailing the failure of prohibition). 
 216. ELY, supra note 202, at 94–95. 
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with society.217 But governmental structure and prescribed processes 
designed to ensure participation in representational government 
properly embody the Constitution’s highest and best function.  
The Constitution’s form and structure demonstrate the Framers’ 
intent to protect fundamental concepts of freedom and liberty primarily 
through democratic processes. Requiring elections of Representatives 
every two years, and expressly naming the federal government as 
guardian against electoral manipulation, are textual proof of that 
commitment.218 Significant debate at the Constitutional Convention in 
1787 turned on insulating the essential processes of government from 
manipulation so that the House of Representatives, for example, actually 
reflected the electorate and were accountable to it.219 The Framers were 
responding to the lack of representation afforded them as colonists, in 
conjunction with fresh memory of rotten boroughs that corrupted 
England’s representative system.220  
North Carolina delegate, John Steele, argued that the Constitution 
would not permit the creation of rotten boroughs, and that if redistricting 
plans that corrupted representation were passed that were “inconsistent 
with the Constitution, independent judges will not uphold them. . . .”221 
Delegate Steele was not alone in characterizing the Constitution’s role as 
both creating and protecting the representational process. The only time 
George Washington addressed the Constitutional Convention on a 
substantive issue, he did so in an effort to increase the degree in which 
elected representatives reflected their constituents.222 George Mason 
claimed that “[r]eps. should sympathize with their constituents; shd. 
think as they think, & feel as they feel.”223 John Adams wrote that the 
 
 217. See ELY, supra note 202, at 88 (explaining that “the few attempts the various framers have 
made to freeze substantive values by designating them for special protection in the document have 
been ill-fated, normally resulting in repeal, either officially or by interpretive pretense.”). 
 218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 181 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 
2001) (“The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should 
be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people 
by a short duration of their appointments . . . . ”)  
 219. See Christopher St. John Yates, A House of Our Own or A House We’ve Outgrown? An 
Argument for Increasing the Size of the House of Representatives, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 157, 
175–76, 175 n.112 (1992) (discussing the history of the Convention). 
 220. See ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 
16 (1965) (discussing England’s monarchy and its impact on the United States’ “idea of representative 
government”).  
 221. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964) (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 71 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) 
[hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]). 
 222. Yates, supra note 219 at 175–76, 175 n.112. 
 223. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 134 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
CUNNINGHAM (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/19/2018  2:26 PM 
1538 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1509 
representative assembly “should be in miniature, an exact portrait of the 
people at large. It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.”224  
Perhaps James Madison was the most ardent defender of protecting 
democratic processes through unimpeded representation. In The 
Federalist No. 52, Madison wrote that “it is particularly essential that the 
[House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, 
and an intimate sympathy with the people.”225 Madison explicitly 
referred to state legislatures and the temptation “to mould their 
regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed.”226 
Madison understood that elected officials would attempt to retain power 
by obstructing the democratic machinery that allows power to change 
hands: 
[T]he State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the 
common interest at the expense of their local conveniency or prejudices 
. . . . [T]he Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrolled 
right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections . . . . It 
was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the 
discretionary power.227 
The Constitution’s concern, and therefore (arguably) the Court’s 
concern, turns on procedural protections ensuring unhindered 
participation in self-governance. The document’s form and structure 
memorialize this central focus of the Framers’ intent.  
B. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO FACILITATE REPRESENTATIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 
The Court has historically exercised judicial review to facilitate 
democratic participation and to remove artificial barriers that obstruct 
fair processes and insulate elected representatives from public 
accountability. The most famous footnote in constitutional jurisprudence 
identified instances that merit “more searching judicial inquiry.”228 
Footnote four in Carolene Products is deservedly famous for identifying 
“discrete and insular minorities” as worthy of heightened judicial 
scrutiny in the face of majoritarian discrimination.229  
But to so limit the footnote’s interpretation is to overlook a critically 
important point. The footnote not only calls for court intervention but 
 
 224. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE 
FOUNDING ERA 403 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
 225. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 256 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001). 
 226. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 223, at 241. 
 227. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 221, at 401. 
 228. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 229. See, e.g., Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 
139, 157 (2012) (citing Carolene Prod. Co.’s footnote four as authority for governmental action dealing 
with morality).  
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also calls for exacting court scrutiny in order to ensure the proper 
working of democratic government.230 Specifically, it requires “more 
exacting scrutiny” when “legislation restricts those political processes 
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation.”231 This language very nearly defines partisan 
gerrymandering, a legislative restriction that obstructs the political 
process by pre-determining election results.232 Even the footnote’s 
protection of discrete and insular minorities is couched in terms of the 
court’s role in protecting the democratic process by highlighting 
prejudice “which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities . . . .”233  
This representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review suggests 
the propriety, even obligation, of judicial engagement in partisan 
redistricting. The Court has certainly engaged in other contexts aimed at 
facilitating representative and participatory functions of democratic 
governance. First Amendment free expression jurisprudence, for 
example, illustrates court intervention to facilitate democratic processes 
just as much as to protect individual rights. The amendment’s language 
focuses on limiting government authority: “Congress shall make no law . 
. . abridging the freedom speech, of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”234 In the first instance, it ensures political speech, including 
open discussion meant to check government overreach.235 Of course, 
non-political speech finds protection here, too, but the protection’s 
robust scope partly derives from ensuring effective democratic 
functioning.236  
More germane to gerrymandering, the Court’s involvement in voting 
disputes confirms the appropriateness of judicial review to ensure proper 
functioning of democratic processes. In the aggregate, the Court’s voting 
decisions make clear that the Constitution protects the right to vote in 
both federal and state elections: “A consistent line of decisions by this 
Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the right of suffrage 
 
 230. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 231. Id.  
 232. See Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining gerrymandering as 
“[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts . . . to give one political party an 
unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength”). 
 233. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 234. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 235. See Kagan, supra note 205, at 428–30 (arguing that First Amendment standards of review 
are designed to check for improper motive). 
 236. See ELY, supra note 202, at 93–94 (stating that although First Amendment protection is not 
limited to political speech, the concept of free speech is principally “intended to help make our 
governmental processes work . . . .”). 
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has made this indelibly clear.”237 The Court has intervened to assert 
constitutional protection for the right to vote,238 to have votes counted239 
and not diluted by ballot box stuffing.240 The Court has intervened to 
scrutinize restrictions on the right to vote, including poll taxes,241 literacy 
tests,242 property ownership,243 and photographic identification.244 The 
Court has interposed its judgement by requiring that states provide 
absentee ballots to those who are incarcerated and awaiting trial.245 Even 
closer to partisan redistricting, the Court has intervened to invalidate 
racial gerrymandering246 and white primaries.247  
But the Court’s decisions in malapportionment redistricting 
represent the closest analogue to partisan gerrymandering.248 The 
question of court intervention in malapportionment cases was not an 
easy one. Passionate disagreement over whether it was proper for the 
Court to intervene, prompted the Court in Baker v. Carr to request that 
the litigants re-argue the case,249 with one Justice so conflicted that he 
recused himself due to illness.250 The Court’s ultimate determination that 
it properly exercised judicial authority in reviewing malapportionment 
claims and that Tennessee’s malapportionment impermissibly diluted 
voting under the Equal Protection Clause had a wide and continuing 
impact.251 Tennessee was not the only state forced to re-draw district 
lines; the controversial ruling affected nearly every state in the union.252 
 
 237. Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964). 
 238. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665, 666–67 (1884). 
 239. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 387 (1915). 
 240. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 387 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 388 (1879). 
 241. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966).  
 242. Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1959).  
 243. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 367 (1981); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 
(1969). 
 244. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008). 
 245. O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974).  
 246. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960). 
 247. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 45–68 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–61 (1944); 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927). 
 248. See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 468 n.9 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Court’s approach to one person-one vote claims could serve as 
a template for a gerrymandering test). 
 249. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 186 (1962). 
 250. Id. at 237; see also Carlo A. Pedrioli, Instrumentalist and Holmesian Voices in the Rhetoric 
of Reapportionment: The Opinions of Justices Brennan and Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr, 4 ALA. C.R. 
& C.L. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (2013) (detailing the Court’s internal debates leading up to the Court’s formal 
decision). 
 251. See generally Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker’s Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern 
Redistricting Revolution: A Plea for Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2002) (discussing state 
experimentation with the standard established in Baker). 
 252. See generally id. 
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Chief Justice Earl Warren characterized this case as the most 
significant of his tenure.253 The Court partially explained the importance 
of its ruling in a later opinion: “The right to vote freely for the candidate 
of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any 
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative 
government.”254 In a series of cases following Baker v. Carr, the Court 
repeatedly emphasized the propriety of Court intervention to ensure 
proper democratic functioning. The Court stressed, for example, that 
“the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic 
society,” and that “any infringement of the right of citizens to vote must 
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”255  
In another malapportionment case, the Court again couched its 
justification for intervention in terms of democratic government. “To say 
that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would . . . run 
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government . . .”.256 
When admonished that state governments are better suited than the 
Court to address irregularities in voting district population, that judicial 
intervention diminishes legislative prerogative, and that a “political 
thicket” and a “mathematical quagmire” would surely attend judicial 
intervention, the Court gave a succinct response. “Our answer is this: a 
denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection; 
our oath and our office require no less of us.”257  
The logic and rationale bolstering judicial review in 
malapportionment disputes applies with equal force to partisan 
gerrymandering. Indeed, Court intervention in gerrymandering disputes 
is arguably more appropriate. Legislators intentionally dilute voting 
equality in gerrymandering disputes, whereas malapportionment arises 
innocently as people migrate from rural to urban districts. In both, the 
avenues normally available to effect change in democratic governance are 
constricted.  
As noted above, the Court has not acted to clear these avenues but 
has abstained for three decades, citing a lack of a judicially manageable 
standard. The precedential purgatory imposed by Vieth remains the law 
of the land. Because Justice Kennedy, as the fifth vote, rejected the 
dissent’s three proposed standards as unworkable, but maintained the 
 
 253. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 306 (1977). 
 254. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 255. Id. at 562. 
 256. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). 
 257. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566. 
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possibility that a workable standard would someday emerge, enormous 
efforts to contrive a suitable standard followed.258  
C. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION TO FACILITATE REPRESENTATIONAL 
DEMOCRACY IN WHITFORD V. GILL  
The claimants in Whitford proposed a new manageable standard 
dubbed the “efficiency gap,” which measures the difference between the 
parties’ wasted votes.259 Votes cast for a losing candidate are deemed 
“wasted” as are votes in excess of what the winning candidate needed to 
prevail.260 Gerrymandering generates substantial “inefficiencies” by 
packing favorable votes into a single district, and by cracking other 
districts results in large numbers of losing votes.261 The efficiency gap 
combines the wasted votes from all districts, reducing the inefficiencies 
to a single percentage.262 Importantly, this measurement also reveals 
entrenchment. States that have efficiency gaps of at least seven percent 
will yield substantially similar election results year over year, despite 
plausible shifts in voter preference.263 The efficiency gap, as a result, 
identifies gerrymanders “that are both severe and entrenched.”264  
The trial court in Whitford did not solely rely on the efficiency gap 
as the definitive standard, but used the measurement when applying a 
three-pronged test.265 The court’s test analyzed whether redistricting: 
“(1) [was] intended to place a severe impediment on the effectiveness of 
the votes of individual citizens on the basis of their political affiliation, 
(2) has that effect, and (3) cannot be justified on other, legitimate 
legislative grounds.”266 The efficiency gap informed the second prong of 
the test by showing that Wisconsin’s map would have ensured 
Republican advantage through the lifetime of the map.267 The ability to 
measure such entrenchment allowed the court to distinguish inherent 
from invidious discrimination, a distinction critical to Equal Protection 
analysis.268  
 
 258. See Stillman, supra note 134, at 1318–21 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is 
an invitation to propose new standards that “cannot help but invite more litigation”).  
 259. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 860–61. But see Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 897–98 (defending an 8 
percent gap as demarcating maps that are presumptively invalid). 
 264. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 836. 
 265. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 884. 
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. at 898–910. 
 268. Id. at 909–10, 913–27.  
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The Supreme Court accepted review but ultimately remanded for 
lack of standing. If the Court abstains in future cases, partisan 
gerrymandering will likely intensify. Arguments favoring abstention 
characterize the efficiency gap as unmanageable.269 The standard, it is 
argued, cannot perfectly account for shifting voter preferences, which 
potentially dilutes entrenchment.270 If shifting voter preferences diffuse 
the gerrymander’s effect, the redistricting occasions no harm. Another 
criticism of the efficiency gap derives from Justice Kennedy’s concern of 
determining “how much partisan dominance is too much.”271 The 
efficiency gap attempts to address that concern by identifying the level of 
inefficiency that yields entrenchment.272 But this standard is itself 
imprecise. The trial court found a seven percent gap presumptively 
violative; the authors of the efficiency gap model posit that an eight 
percent gap is presumptively violative.273  
As noted above, however, the standard need not perfectly 
implement the constitution’s meaning. Constitutional jurisprudence 
overflows with imprecise standards.274 Again, malapportionment serves 
as the closest analogue. The malapportionment standard, one person, 
one vote, was lauded for its ease of administration, its manageability.275 
But a closer study reveals instances where strict adherence to the 
standard was impracticable.276 As a result, the Court recalibrated the 
standard, holding redistricting presumptively unlawful when population 
deviations exceed ten percent.277 Presumptive invalidity of ten percent in 
malapportionment cases is not dissimilar from presumptive invalidity of 
seven percent in gerrymandering cases. The efficiency gap does not 
perfectly reflect equal protection’s promise, but it isn’t required to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Whitford v. Gill presented a missed opportunity to look more closely 
at the Court’s past refusal to decide gerrymandering disputes. The 
political question doctrine and, more particularly, the prudential 
 
 269. See Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin State Senate and Wisconsin State Assembly at 3, Gill v. 
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 1506064, at *3. 
 270. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 895–96. 
 271. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 897–98.  
 272. Stephanopoulos & McGhee, supra note 32, at 836–37.  
 273. Compare Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 860–61 (2016), with Stephanopoulos & 
McGhee, supra note 32, at 897–98. 
 274. See supra Part III. 
 275. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (2000) 
(describing one person, one vote as having the “virtue of being easy to administer”). 
 276. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964). 
 277. See id. (“Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with 
a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations.”) (citations 
omitted). 
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requirement that the Court abstain if it lacks a judicially manageable 
standard, has heretofore stopped the Court from identifying those 
gerrymanders that violate equal protection. But an analysis of the 
manageable standard requirement reveals the Court’s failure to define 
what a manageable standard is. More disconcerting, the Court has 
applied the manageable standard requirement haphazardly, illustrated 
by scores of court-made standards that either over- or under-enforce the 
constitutional norm they purport to implement. Why is “fairness” a 
manageable standard in some contexts but not others? How are 
standards that measure one’s shocked conscious, or weigh the totality of 
the circumstances judicially manageable?  
While a review of the Court’s application of the manageability 
requirement yields few insights, one common thread connects the 
Court’s use of the manageability requirement to its insecurity in 
exercising judicial review, indicating that the Court often applies the 
manageability requirement when particularly insecure in exercising the 
judicial function. Recast in this light, the question of Court engagement 
in gerrymandering disputes turns on the propriety of Court intervention 
to address artificial obstacles that disrupt democratic functionality, a 
question squarely within the judicial role. The Constitution as a whole, in 
structure and form, demonstrates the document’s principal aim of 
ensuring representational democracy through prescribed processes. The 
relatively few provisions in the Constitution that memorialize 
substantive rights are sporadic and enfolded into the broader 
constitutional design that details democratic processes.  
The Court’s jurisprudence also favors intervention. In analogous 
contexts, the Court has identified manageable standards in disputes 
involving artificial obstacles to proper democratic functioning. Whether 
impediments to voting, malapportionment, or racial gerrymandering, 
the Court consistently and appropriately intervenes to protect popular 
sovereignty and to ensure that those in power cannot insulate themselves 
by fabricating barriers to democratic processes.  
Court intervention is warranted. The Framers contemplated the 
Court’s role to include correcting artificial strictures on representational 
democracy, the Court has historically and successfully done so, and 
adequate judicial tools exist to measure and censure harmful partisan 
gerrymandering. One of the Court’s central responsibilities is to protect 
democratic governance. The Court has recognized as much historically. 
It should do so again and directly address the constitutionality of partisan 
gerrymandering. 
